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INTRODUCTION
On May 14, 2012, a combat helicopter operated by European Union
Naval Forces (EUNAVFOR) struck a pirate base ashore in Somalia.1 The
raid destroyed several fiberglass skiffs on the beach in Haradheere, a town
on the coast of central Somalia.2 The attack represented a new tactic used
in the protracted and evolving international effort to fight maritime piracy
off the coast of Somalia. It was the first time that force ashore, first
authorized by the United Nations Security Council in 2008, had been
publicly acknowledged.3
Though recently receding, piracy off the coast of Somalia has had a
destabilizing effect on maritime commerce since at least 2008.4 The
problem has not suffered from lack of attention. Navies from across the
globe patrol the seas off of Somalia, many multinational conferences have
addressed the issue, and dozens of articles have analyzed and suggested
solutions to the problem.5 Many observers have explained the recent drop
by pointing to the increased use of private armed security teams on
commercial vessels that transit pirate-infested waters.6 While that may be
the case, this Article examines the legal framework for a strategy that has
not been attempted on any great scale—the use of military force ashore in
Somalia to disrupt and deter piracy off its coast.
This analysis is important for at least two reasons. First, piracy might
only be receding temporarily. Little has been done on land in Somalia to
1. Jeffrey Gettleman, Toughening its Stand, European Union Sends Forces to Strike Somali
Pirate Base, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/world/africa/europeanforces-strike-pirate-base-in-somalia.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Int’l Mar. Org., Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Annual Report–
2009 2, IMO Doc. MSC.4/Circ. 152 (Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter IMO Piracy Report].
5. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1950, ¶¶ 16–50, U.N. Doc. S/2011/662 (Oct. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Res. 1950 Report].
6. See Security Keeping Gulf of Aden Pirates at Bay, OCEAN PROTECTION SERVICES (June 29,
2012), http://www.oceanprotectionservices.com/articles/?p=1865 (“. . .[the] Minister of Shipping for
the Department of Transport in the UK [. . .] said the adoption of more self-defensive measures by
private shipping companies to fend off pirate attacks is certainly helping to stem the onslaught of
marauding pirates”).
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disrupt the pirates’ core infrastructure and capabilities. Indeed, as recently
as August 2013, fifty-seven hostages and four vessels were still being held
for ransom, though hostages continue to be released and the number has
continued to drop.7 Second, piracy is not a new phenomenon. A close look
at the legal framework for the use of force ashore that developed in this
recent flare-up could yield important lessons for dealing more effectively
with future problems.
Throughout this crisis, military and maritime security experts
identified action ashore as most likely to disrupt piracy off the coast of
Somalia.8 The U.N. Security Council, which has addressed the issue many
times, first authorized in 2008 “all necessary measures . . . in Somalia” to
suppress piracy at sea, and has subsequently renewed its authorization on
an annual basis.9 Even so, the EUNAVFOR’s May 2012 strike in
Haradheere was the first publicly acknowledged use of force following the
U.N.’s 2008 authorization.10 Legal uncertainties surrounding what type of
7. According to the International Maritime Bureau, as of August 2013. See Piracy News &
Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracy
newsafigures (last visited May 17, 2015); see also OFFICER OF THE WATCH, MARITIME PIRACY MON.
REP. 2 (Aug. 2013). In June 2014, eleven sailors held hostage for three and a half years were freed.
Somali Pirates Release Sailors, AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, June 7, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/world/africa/somali-pirates-release-sailors-held-for-years.html.
As recently as October 2014, an additional seven sailors were exchanged for ransom. Somalia: Pirates
Release Indian Sailors Held for 4 Years, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 2014, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/01/world/africa/somalia-pirates-free-indian-sailors-held-for-4years.html. Additionally, one commentator noted in October 2013 that recent conditions in southern
Somalia had created the conditions for piracy to resurface. See Currun Singh, Al Shabab Fights the
Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/opinion/international/alshabab-fights-the-pirates.html.
8. See LAUREN PLOCH ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40528, PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF
AFRICA 27 (2009); see also Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Military: Somali Pirates Expanding Their Range,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/01/26/us-military-somali-piratesexpanding-their-range. Legislative leaders in the U.S. have also encouraged action ashore. See Ike
Skelton, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Skelton Urges President Obama to Fight Piracy
by Denying Safe Haven in Somalia, U.S. FED. NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 17, 2009 (“I encourage [President
Obama] to pursue these pirates beyond the waters we are currently patrolling and into the safe havens
where they are operating. Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution requires no less. Furthermore,
established authorities such as United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1846 and 1851 have
expanded the ability of international forces to conduct counter-piracy operations within Somali
territory.”).
9. S.C. Res. 1851, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (“[s]tates and regional
organizations for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the Secretary-General
may undertake all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing
acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, pursuant to the request of the TFG, . . . consistent with
applicable international humanitarian and human rights law.”). This authority has been renewed
annually. See S.C. Res. 2125, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2125 (Nov. 18, 2013).
10. Gettleman, supra note 2. Although there have been other uses of force in Somalia related to
piracy, they generally fell into the category of hostage rescue versus disrupting pirate activities. See,
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force ashore was authorized, and what law applied to such force, possibly
contributed to the delay.11
This Article analyzes the international legal framework authorizing
and governing the use of force on land in Somalia to eliminate the pirates’
means of carrying out lethal attacks at sea. Part I addresses the
fundamental question of whether the use of military force against pirates
and their bases ashore is legally supportable. Several major justifications
are examined, including consent of the sovereign, decisions of the U.N.
Security Council, and self-defense. I argue that because the Security
Council has authorized “all necessary measures” pursuant to Somali
government consent, the use of force in Somalia to accomplish the goal of
suppressing piracy at sea is authorized, consistent with the limitations set
forth in the applicable Resolutions.
After concluding that the Security Council’s mandate includes
military force in Somalia, Part II examines what body of law would apply
to the practical implementation of such operations. The case of armed
pirates’ activities ashore is unique in that it may not rise to the level of a
traditional armed conflict—the threshold at which International
Humanitarian Law (IHL), sometimes referred to as the Law of Armed
Conflict (LOAC), would apply. IHL is considered the lex specialis
generally applicable to the use of force.12 The question of how an armed
conflict with groups of pirate-fighters would be characterized is fully
explored in this section. I conclude that even if this unique scenario does
not rise to the level of an armed conflict, there are significant reasons why
IHL should be found to apply to the limited use of force in Somalia. Most
importantly, the application of IHL is necessary to give full effect to the

e.g., French Troops Seize Somali Pirates After Hostages are Freed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2008,
http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/04/11/world/africa/11iht-yacht.4.11921315.html.
11. See Eugene Kontorovich, International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia,
ASIL INSIGHTS (Feb. 6, 2009), http://www.asil.org/insights090206.cfm; see also ROBIN GEISS & ANNA
PETRIG, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AT SEA: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTER-PIRACY
OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND THE GULF OF ADEN 131–34 (2011).
12. There is considerable debate about whether—and how—IHL would displace other legal
norms, most notably international human rights law. For the purpose of this Article, I set aside the
challenging question of overlap and focus on the potential application of IHL. Even so, some
difficulties presented by potential areas of overlap are explored in Part II, infra. See also Oona
Hathaway, Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship Between International
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1883, 1893–912 (2012); U.N. OFF. OF
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01, U.N. Sales No. E.11.XIV.3 (2011); Francoise
J. Hampson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law from
the Perspective of a Human Rights Treaty Body, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 549, 550 (2008).

12_OBERT_FORMAT 2 MACROS(DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

6/10/2015 10:43 PM

USING FORCE ON LAND

201

Security Council’s decision, at Somalia’s request, that force be used in
Somalia to suppress piracy.
It is true that pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia continue to
recede.13 At the same time, reports indicate that suspected pirates and even
innocent fisherman are being killed by overeager and untrained security
guards embarked on vessels transiting pirate-infested waters.14 If the recent
ebb of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is due to private embarked
security teams using unlawful force against pirates, it may be time to
rethink any assumption that the use of targeted force ashore is too risky, or
less humane.15
The use of force ashore naturally carries with it great risks as well.
While I briefly note the most significant ones, I set aside as much as
possible any broader considerations of policy and strategy. My goal is to
propose a framework for how operations can be planned and conducted to
satisfy international legal regimes if the use of force ashore meets desired
policy ends.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE IN SOMALIA
Depending on the circumstances, at least three possible justifications
could support the use of force in Somali land territory to suppress piracy.
Before looking at each of these possible justifications in more detail,
though, it is worth a brief look at what organized groups of armed pirates in
Somalia actually do on dry land.
With the ability to launch attacks up to 1,000 miles off of the Somali
coast, the shore-based infrastructure to support sustained piracy operations
is robust.16 At one point, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

13. See Singh, supra note 7.
14. See Michelle Wiese Bockmann & Alan Katz, Shooting to Kill Pirates Risks Blackwater
Moment, BLOOMBERG, May 9, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-08/shooting-to-killpirates-risks-blackwater-moment.html (“According to many interviewed maritime security firms, ship
owner groups, lawyers and insurance companies, fear of pirate attacks has increased the likelihood of
violent encounters at sea, as untrained or overeager vessel guards have resorted to shooting
indiscriminately without first properly assessing the actual threat level. In the process, they have killed
both pirates and sometimes innocent fishermen as well as jeopardized the reputation of private maritime
security firms with their reckless gun use. Since many of the new maritime security companies that
have emerged often also enlist the services of off-duty policemen and former soldiers that saw combat
in Iraq and Afghanistan, worries of a ‘Blackwater out in the Indian Ocean’ have only intensified.”).
15. The use of force on board vessels is governed by the flag state’s domestic law. See U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 94, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. This would include criminal liability for the unlawful use of force by armed
security personnel, but further analysis of this liability is beyond the scope of this Article.
16. David Von Drehle, The Arabia Sea, TIME, Feb. 28, 2011, at 13 (noting that the Somali pirates
“have extended their range as far south as Madagascar and as far east as the islands off India.”).
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knew of at least nine substantial logistics centers.17 The largest, termed
“Great Pumpkin” because orange tarps were visible well out into the sea, at
one time contained vast numbers of small boats, or skiffs, as wells as
whalers and other larger vessels capable of serving as “mother ships”—
floating logistics bases that organized pirate groups use to extend their
reach and to launch attacks farther from shore.18 Pirate clans also store
consumable supplies ashore in bulk, including barrels of fuel and water,
grappling hooks, automatic and semi-automatic weapons, and utility
vehicles.19
Higher up the pirate organizational chain, financiers and pirate clan
leaders direct operations from secure centers, sometimes isolated from the
civilian population.20 “Somali pirates operate from well-equipped and
well-armed bases ashore along the Indian Ocean coast of Central Somalia
and Puntland, from the port towns of Caluula, Eyl, Hobyo, and
Haradheere.”21 Pirate networks are even reportedly funded via a “stock
exchange” located in Haradheere, at which investors can buy or sell shares
in upcoming attacks.22 Ransom negotiators work from shore,23 and the
trafficking in weapons—predominantly AKMs, RPG-7s, AK47s, and semiautomatic pistols such as the TT-30,24 as well as grenade-launchers—is
usually completed ashore. Though it remains controversial, circumstantial
evidence has tied pirate clans to Al Shabaab, the Islamic militant group
widely considered a terrorist organization.25
Pirate operations ashore thus represent a center of gravity that
supports their continued attacks on vessels at sea by organized groups of
armed pirate-fighters. Disrupting this center of gravity by denying them

17. See Nato Frustrated Amid Somali Piracy Deluge, BBC NEWS (Oct. 22, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-11609724.
18. Id.; see also Tom Tulloch, The Problem with Pirates, 71 SITREP 3, 5 (2011).
19. Nato Frustrated Amid Somali Piracy Deluge, supra note 17; Tulloch, supra note 18.
20. See U.S. NAT’L SECURITY COUNCIL, COUNTERING PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA:
PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN (2008) [hereinafter PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN].
21. Id. at 5.
22. Bruce Sterling, The Pirate Stock Exchange, WIRED, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.wired.com/
beyond_the_beyond/2009/12/the-pirate-stock-exchange.
23. See United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
24. See Somali Pirates Killed “Legally”, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/7791236.stm.
25. See, e.g., Jonathan Saul and Camila Reed, Shabaab-Somali pirate links growing: UN adviser,
REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/ozatp-somalia-shabaab-piratesidAFJOE79J0G620111020; see also Richard Lough, Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali militants,
REUTERS (Jul. 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/somalia-piracy-idUSLDE7650
U320110706; Al Qaeda Urges Somalis To Attack Ships, CBS (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com
/8301-503543_162-4949488-503543.html; but see Singh, supra note 7.
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logistics and operating bases ashore would likely cripple their ability to
continue to sustain attacks at sea.
Although the number of recently reported pirate attacks is down
significantly, there is little evidence that the Somali pirates’ capacity for
continued violence has been diminished.26 Indeed, armed pirates are still
holding hostages ashore and could re-commence attacks if the widespread
deployment of armed security on board transiting merchant vessels is
abated.27 The Somali government has continued to request international
support, most recently in November 2013.28 The government’s consistent
requests for support from 2008 through the present, even in the face of an
apparent decline in piracy attacks at sea, underscore their inability to deal
with the militia-type lawlessness of the armed groups of pirates, including
the holding of hostage-prisoners ashore.29 Thus, a legal framework for
possible action ashore is an important part of any effective long-term antipiracy strategy.
There are at least three possible justifications under international law
that would support the use of force in Somali land territory to suppress
piracy. First, the U.N. Security Council could act—and indeed has acted—
to authorize such force.30 Because this authorization is still currently in
effect and has presumably been relied upon by states to support military
operations, it is the most relevant to this analysis.31
This current authorization is further legitimized by a second, ongoing
justification of consent on the part of the Somali government.32 Though

26. See Singh, supra note 7.
27. Id.
28. See S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, at 2 (“. . .noting the several requests from Somali authorities
for international assistance to counter piracy off its coast, including the letter of 12 November 2013,
from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations expressing the appreciation of
Somali authorities to the Security Council for its assistance, expressing their willingness to consider
working with other States and regional organizations to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
coast of Somalia, and requesting that the provisions of resolution 2077 (2012) be renewed for an
additional twelve months.”).
29. Throughout this Article, “Somalia” and “Somali government” refer to the internationally
recognized sovereign authority of the state of Somalia. Prior to August 20, 2012, this was the
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which is referenced in Resolution 1851. See TRANSITIONAL
FEDERAL CHARTER FOR THE SOMALI REPUBLIC, Feb. 2004. In 2012, the Federal Republic of Somalia
was created by a new constitution. See PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
SOMALIA, Aug. 1, 2012. Both have the same functional authority under international law as the
recognized sovereign government of Somalia, and are treated the same for purposes of this Article.
30. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, ¶ 10.
31. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, ¶ 10; see also Gettleman,
supra note 1.
32. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 10 (“[the Council] affirms further that such authorizations
have been provided only following the receipt of the 9 December 2008 letter conveying the consent of
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Somalia could also grant consent to third-party states on an ad hoc basis
under its sovereign authority and consistent with its international legal
obligations, there are no indications that it has done so. Instead, the current
framework seems to be consent-based, but ratified by the Security Council
under its Chapter VII authority.
A third potential justification, self-defense, does not seem to have
been proposed or debated in the situation in Somalia on any significant
scale. It could potentially arise, however, in the more limited case of
hostage rescue operations. Each of these potential justifications will be
examined in turn.
A. U.N. Security Council action under Chapter VII
The U.N. Security Council has the power to determine “the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and to
“decide what measures shall be taken . . . to restore international peace and
security.”33 If the Council deems the threat significant enough, it may
authorize “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security.”34
The Security Council has addressed the issue of piracy off the coast of
Somalia at least twelve times, beginning with Resolution 1816 in 2008.35
This and other early resolutions are widely considered not to have created
any significant new international legal authority, and mostly call on states
to take actions that were already authorized under international law.36
Resolution 1816 did include authority for states cooperating with the
Somali government to enter Somali territorial waters “for the purpose of
repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea,” but it did not include
any mention of Somali land territory.37 Thus, despite its seemingly broad
the [Somali Transitional Federal Government]”); see also Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and
Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 399, 406 (2009).
33. U.N. Charter art. 39, ¶ 1.
34. U.N. Charter art. 42, ¶ 1.
35. S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008); S.C. Res. 1838, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1838 (Oct. 7, 2008); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008); Error! Bookmark
not defined.S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1897 (Nov. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1918, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1918 (Apr. 27, 2010); S.C. Res. 1950, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1950 (Nov. 23, 2010); S.C. Res. 1976,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1976 (Apr. 11, 2011); S.C. Res. 2015, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2015 (Oct. 24, 2011); S.C.
Res. 2020, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2020 (Nov. 22, 2011); S.C. Res. 2077, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2077 (Nov. 21,
2012); S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9.
36. See S.C. Res. 1846, supra note 35, 1, (“Further reaffirming that international law, as reflected
in [UNCLOS], sets out the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea”).
This affirmation can also be found in S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at 1, S.C. Res 1897, supra note 35,
at 1, and S.C. Res 1918, supra note 35, at 1. See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 72–3.
37. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 35, ¶ 7.
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language, the Council’s first steps did not empower nations to do much
beyond what they already could, and certainly did not purport to take any
action with respect to Somali territory.38 The authorizations were
effectively a call to states to take the full measures within their power to
fight piracy at sea.39
1. Resolution 1851: Authorization and Restrictions of Operative
Paragraph 6
In December 2008, the Security Council greatly expanded its
authorization by taking action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.40
Resolution 1851 authorized states to take counter-piracy action on Somali
land territory, and it authorized “all necessary measures” to do so,
connoting military force.41 The specific authorization, though, came with
important caveats, set forth in Operative Paragraph 6:
“States and regional organizations . . . for which advance
notification has been provided by the TFG [Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia] to the Secretary-General may undertake
all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the
purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea,
pursuant to the request of the TFG, . . . consistent with applicable
international humanitarian and human rights law.42

While Paragraph 6 clearly broadened enforcement measures to Somali
land territory, there has been debate as to how far that broadening was
intended to go, and what specific measures are in fact authorized.43 States
may undertake “all necessary measures”—text that is commonly accepted

38. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 71–72 (explaining that S.C. Res. 1846 is widely
interpreted to have expanded enforcement measures authorized on the high seas into Somali territorial
waters).
39. Id. One area in which authority was expanded was the entry into Somali territorial waters.
States responded to this charge through international naval action. See Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5 ,
¶ 66.
40. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at 2.
41. Id., See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 83.
42. S.C. Res. 1851, supra, note 9, ¶ 6 (emphasis added).
43. The debate surrounding the adoption of S.C. Res. 1851 indicated disagreement on how
exactly the land-based authorization would be worded, but it is generally accepted that the authorization
includes Somali land territory and the airspace above it. See Kontorovich, supra note 11 (stating that
Resolution 1851 “extend[s] the authorization of military force to land-based operations in Somalia
mainland”) (internal citation omitted). See also Douglas Guilfoyle, The Laws of War and the Fight
against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?, 11 MELBOURNE J. OF INT’L L., 1, 7 (2010); GEISS &
PETRIG, supra note 11, at 82, 131–34; but see Security Council Passes New Resolution on Somalia
Piracy, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE ( Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://www.aaj.tv/2008/12/securitycouncil-passes-new-resolution-on-somalia-piracy/ (“to overcome objections from countries such as
Indonesia, the sponsors dropped an earlier reference in the text to “ashore” or “including in Somali
airspace.”).
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to include the authorization for military force—but in this case with several
express and implied restrictions.44
First, advance notification must be “provided by the [Somali federal
government] to the Secretary-General.”45 Besides the express requirement
that the Somali government notify the Secretary-General prior to the
commencement of any operation within Somali territory, the provision also
could be interpreted to include an implied requirement that the Somali
government must concur with each action taken under the paragraph.46
Presumably, if the TFG does not concur, it need not notify the SecretaryGeneral and the proposed measures would therefore not come to bear. Of
note, there is nothing in the Resolution requiring the Somali government to
make any particular notification, but the notification necessarily must be
made in order for the authority contained in the Resolution to become
effective.47
Second, measures taken must be “appropriate in Somalia” and “for the
purpose of suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.”48 It is not
clear whether the mandate that the action be “appropriate” adds any
substantive restriction, especially given that the Somali government must
implicitly approve any operation. The requirement that action on land
likewise be linked to the suppression of piracy at sea is very general and
consistent with the broadened mandate of Paragraph 6.
Finally, measures taken must be “consistent with applicable
international humanitarian and human rights law.”49 The reference to both
IHL, as well as the more generally applicable human rights law (HRL), is
significant. It is an implicit recognition that, given the gravity of the threat
to international security that piracy poses, there may be limited situations in
which IHL would apply to the “all necessary measures” authorized

44. See ALEX CONTE, SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE UNITED NATIONS, AFGHANISTAN
AND IRAQ 155–57 (2005); see also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 83. Additionally, though not
currently at issue, the authorization was set to expire after twelve months from the date of adoption of
resolution 1851. See S.C. Res. 1851 supra note 9, ¶ 6. It has subsequently been extended annually, most
recently in November 2013 for an additional twelve months, and has not lapsed since originally
implemented. See also S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9, at 2 (noting that the Somali government provided
continued consent in a letter dated November 12, 2013).
45. S.C. Res. 1851 supra note 9, ¶ 6.
46. S.C. Res. 1851 also contains a further restriction limiting it to “cooperating states.” Id. This
section analyzes the requirement for notification to the Secretary-General by the TFG, which I consider
to be substantively the same. The precise mechanics of this process are not clear, and how they were
executed in practice during the EUNAVFOR use of force has not been made publicly available.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 6.
49. Id.
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ashore.50 Because IHL is the lex specialis that generally applies to the use
of force during times of armed conflict,51 the Security Council’s reference
to it implies that at least some use of military force was envisioned
pursuant to the authority granted in Paragraph 6. The inclusion of IHL
would otherwise have no practical effect. The body of law that actually
applies to measures taken against pirates depends on several factors and is
analyzed in Part II.
2. Other indications that Resolution 1851 authorizes military force
In addition to the “all necessary measures” authorization contained in
Paragraph 6, several other factors support an interpretation that the Security
Council intended to authorize the use of military force ashore.52
First, the U.N. published Resolution 1851 by heralding that the
Security Council “authorizes states to use land-based operations in
Somalia.”53 Paragraph 2 of that Resolution permits, without geographic
restriction, the “seizure and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other
related equipment” when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting their
use in piracy.54 This implies that destruction is also permissible,
particularly if seizure is impractical. The use of the term “disposition”
implies that the seizing state can dispose of the materiel seized lawfully,55
including destroying it remotely on land.56 The text of Resolution 1851,

50. Some have maintained that the reference to IHL “appears to be a savings clause included out
of an abundance of caution.” See, e.g., Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 7 (arguing that the use of
“applicable” refers to the international humanitarian law that would otherwise apply). Given that force
on land in Somalia was within the scope of authority of Resolution 1851, a more persuasive reading
would be to give the Council’s words operative effect in the context of what actions were being
authorized versus explaining them away or dismissing them as a mere contingency.
51. See Hampson, supra note 12.
52. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6.
53. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorizes States to Use Land-Based
Operations in Somalia, as Part of Fight Against Piracy Off Coast, Unanimously Adopting 1851, U.N.
Press Release SC/9541 (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinafter Press Release SC/9541].
54. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2 (calling on states to deploy naval vessels and military
aircraft, but not specifically ground forces). Even so, Paragraph 2 calls upon states “to take part
actively in the fight against piracy . . . consistent with this resolution and international law,” which
recognizes the creation of additional authority in Res. 1851. Id. It also authorizes “seizure and
disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and
armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
such use,” notably without geographic reference. Id. Therefore, destroying “boats, vessels, arms and
other related equipment” in Somali territory is consistent with Paragraph 2.
55. Throughout this article, “materiel” is used to refer to pirates’ “boats, vessels, arms and other
related equipment” referenced in S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2.
56. For a discussion of the standards for seizure and destruction of pirates’ materiel under
UNCLOS and S.C. Res. 2077, see Matteo Crippa, Liability for the Destruction of Suspected
Pirate Skiffs?, COMMUNIS HOSTIS OMNIUM (Jan. 3, 2013), http://piracy-law.com/2013/01/04/is-there-a-
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therefore, authorizes at least the destruction of the materiel needed by
pirates to execute their violent acts.
Second, the Council members’ explanations of votes offer strong
support for the notion that military force on land is authorized. The United
Kingdom representative, David Miliband, explained that “[t]he
authorization conferred by Paragraph 6 . . . enabled States and regional
organizations to act with force, if necessary, on land in
Somalia.”57 Additionally, using the language of IHL, he further noted that
the “use of force, however, must be both necessary and proportionate.”58
Representative Jan Grauls of Belgium noted that the “resolution allowed
combat against piracy both on sea and land.”59
Even those wary of the relevant provision acknowledged that it
allowed the use of force on land. Representative Dumisani Kumalo of
South Africa “expressed concern over the provision in the resolution that
allowed for States to conduct land-based operations against piracy, saying
there was a danger that innocent Somalis could fall victim to those
operations.”60 This statement suggests that Council members considered
unintended loss of innocent life consistent with the doctrine of doubleeffect.61
For the United States, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that
“pursuing pirates on land would have a significant impact,” and that
“[m]aritime operations alone were insufficient for combating piracy.”62
Some Council members expressed a further desire for a U.N. peacekeeping
force in Somalia with both “maritime and land elements.”63 Council
members were notably impacted by Somalia’s strong support for
Resolution 1851, underscoring the resolution’s international legitimacy.64
Third, the application of force ashore by the European Union in the
spring of 2012, coupled with a lack of international protest and implied
ratification by both the Somali government and the Security Council, add a

liability-for-the-destruction-of-suspected-pirate-skiffs/.
57. Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The doctrine of double-effect allows for the possibility of harm as an unintended consequence
of the pursuit of a just or lawful course of action. See SHADIA B. DRURY, AQUINAS AND MODERNITY:
THE LOST PROMISE OF NATURAL LAW 67–68 (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
62. Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53.
63. Id. (“Egypt looked forward to having the Security Council study the option of deploying a
United Nations peacekeeping force in Somalia, to act as a “safety valve,” with the possibility of
exploring ways to enhance the peacekeeping force with both “maritime and land elements.”).
64. Id. See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 84–85.
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highly persuasive historical gloss to the text of Resolution 1851. The
EUNAVFOR’s destruction of several fiberglass skiffs on the beach in
Haradheere was widely reported in May of 2012.65 Months later, the
Somali government requested continued assistance from the international
community, and the Council passed Resolution 2077 in November 2012,
renewing the authorization in Paragraph 6 of Resolution 1851 for a further
twelve months.66 This implied ratification of military action by both the
Somali government and the Security Council compels an interpretation that
the use of force on land is authorized, at least with regard to the destruction
of “boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment” when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting their use in piracy.67
Despite this evidence, some commentators have been reticent to
acknowledge the full force of the Security Council’s decision. Some have
concluded that Resolution 1851 merely continues a law enforcement
paradigm, and that Paragraph 6 possibly “envisages operations in which
external actors engage in law enforcement activities in the territory of a
failed state. . . .”68 One commentator noted that the “shift from a military
to a law-enforcement paradigm is particularly pronounced with Resolution
1851.”69 While Resolution 1851 does speak to increased cooperation and
action in the realm of prosecution, it seems that the weight of the evidence
supports the conclusion that military force was envisioned as a necessary
measure for combating piracy at sea.70
65. See, e.g., Gettleman, supra note 1.
66. S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 35, ¶ 12. This authorization was further renewed in S.C. Res.
2125, supra note 9.
67. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 35, ¶ 10.
68. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 132–33. Geiss and Petrig refer to the “overall aim of
ensuring the long term security of international navigation off the coast of Somalia,” and the emphasis
on effectively investigating and prosecuting piracy as a crime as support for the argument that the law
enforcement paradigm was confirmed in Resolution 1851. Id. Though they acknowledge that counterpiracy operations “could eventually reach the threshold of non-international armed conflict, thereby
triggering the application of [IHL],” they fail to acknowledge the strong indications that force was
authorized. Id. Resolution 1851 was not the first Security Council action addressing piracy off the coast
of Somalia. Clearly, Paragraph 6 indicates that more aggressive action needed to be taken. See S.C. Res.
1851, supra note 9. Further, the Resolution’s purpose of “suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery
at sea,” does not particularly support the argument that the Security Council “confirmed the law
enforcement paradigm.” Id. Instead, the argument likely supported by that premise is that the Security
Council recognized the link in Paragraph 6 between action ashore and suppressing acts of piracy at sea,
and that it chose to take more decisive action against pirates.
69. See Douglas Guilfoyle, Piracy off Somalia: a sketch of the legal framework, BLOG OF THE
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.ejiltalk.org/piracy-offsomalia-a-sketch-of-the-legal-framework.
70. Id. Other scholars have significantly limited their analysis of the full implications of
Resolution 1851. See, e.g., Milena Sterio, International Law in Crisis: Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia,
44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 295 (2011) (“. . . to chase pirates after the original piracy encounter,
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Because of the plain language of Resolution 1851, the clearly
expressed intent of the Security Council members that the text conveys the
authorization to use force, and the implied ratification of forcible measures
actually taken, the use of authorized force in Somalia is consistent with the
limitations set forth in the Resolution.71
B. Consent of the sovereign
Within its territory, a sovereign state—Somalia in this case—generally
retains ultimate authority under international law and could invite other
states to cooperate or to act independently in a wide range of scenarios.72
Under international law, the sovereign retains ultimate accountability under
this scenario to ensure that applicable human rights norms are followed.73
Outside of that broad and general restriction, the sovereign retains
control to determine the character of international assistance taken pursuant
to its consent. This becomes relevant when looking at the law applicable to
any action taken under such consent, as we will see in the following section
on the law applicable to the use of force in Somali territory.
In addition to stipulations, Somalia could determine whether such
actions were strictly law enforcement in nature, or assist in determining
and to even enter Somali land.”)
71. With the caveats that are listed in Paragraph 6, as described S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9.
72. Although not without its problems, the perception that the Somali government is nonfunctioning is not widely accepted. The new Somali Federal Government took over from a transitional
government in August 2012, and has stepped into the previous role of the TFG. While previous Security
Council Resolutions referenced the TFG, the most recent resolution only references the “new Somali
government.” See Somali Leaders Back New Constitution, BBC NEWS (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-africa-19075685; see also James Fergusson, Somalia: A Failed State Is Back From
The Dead, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 13, 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/somaliaa-failed-state-is-back-from-the-dead-8449310.html. So, while this section applies Security Council
action to Somalia only in the broader context, the framework for analysis could be looked at even more
generally. Land-based piracy networks have existed before, and there is some evidence that they are
becoming more prevalent in different parts of the world, though admittedly not on the scale seen in the
Horn of Africa.
73. See Ashley S. Deeks, Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy, 54
HARV. INT’L LAW J. 1, 6–10 (2013); see also U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, Study on targeted killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (“The
proposition that a State may consent to the use of force on its territory by another State is not legally
controversial. But while consent may permit the use of force, it does not absolve either of the concerned
States from their obligations to abide by human rights law and IHL with respect to the use of lethal
force against a specific person. The consenting State’s responsibility to protect those on its territory
from arbitrary deprivation of the right to life applies at all times. A consenting State may only lawfully
authorize a killing by the targeting State to the extent that the killing is carried out in accordance with
applicable IHL or human rights law.”) citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6,
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, G.A. Res. 51/191, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/51/191 (Dec. 16, 1996).
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whether pirates constituted an armed insurgency, depending on the relevant
facts. Somalia could clarify the relevance of Somali law to the action
against pirate camps, and also the status of individuals associated with
foreign armed forces and governments in Somalia, including their potential
liability under Somali law for acts taken that don’t go as planned.
While there is no current indication that Somalia has provided specific
consent to any individual state to use force ashore to suppress piracy, its
consent provided the foundation for Resolution 1851.74 The Security
Council specifically referenced this consent in the Resolution, adding that
its authorization under Chapter VII was not intended to create any new
norm of customary international law.75 Thus, consent is currently in place,
but it is exercised via the Security Council rather than potentially more
cumbersome bilateral or multilateral agreements with other states.
C. Self-defense
Though the Security Council has authorized the use of force ashore in
Somalia, force could still be justified in the absence of such authorization
under certain limited circumstances. If a state’s military forces or vessels
sailing under its flag were subject to an armed attack, it would have the
right under international law to respond with necessary and proportional
force in self-defense.76 Although the U.N. Charter forbids the use of
force,77 nothing impairs the right to act in self-defense “if an armed attack
occurs against” a member state.78 Necessary and proportional force could
include the authority to take action to eliminate the threat, as long as the
pirates are still demonstrating an imminent hostile intent.79
More difficult questions arise when pirates operating ashore present
an imminent threat to U.S. vessels and U.S. persons at sea.80 The
74. Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53; see also S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6.
75. Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53; see also Treves, supra note 32, at 406 (“Indeed, the
activities purportedly ‘authorized’ by the Security Council in light of the coastal state’s authorization
could also be conducted in the absence of a Security Council resolution adopted within the framework
of Chapter VII.”).
76. U.N. Charter art. 51.
77. U.N. Charter art. 51, ¶ 4.
78. U.N. Charter art. 51.
79. See Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Resurrecting “Romantics at War”: International SelfDefense in the Shadow of the Law of War—Where Are the Borders?, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 205,
219 (2006) (“[t]he permissible use of force is limited to acts of state self-defense, which can be
performed only in response to an armed attack, including an imminent threat to amount to an armed
attack.”).
80. See Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to Combat This Critical
National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 81 (2012) (“In just the past few years, pirates
have attacked U.S. vessels on several occasions. The attack on the Alabama described in the
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resolution of these complex questions of self-defense is beyond the scope
of this analysis. The issue is only highlighted here as a possible
justification for the use of force under very narrow circumstances.81 As of
now, self-defense has not been advanced as a viable justification for the use
of force on land to suppress piracy, and there is no indication that the
EUNAVFOR relied on self-defense to support recent actions taken
ashore.82
Indeed, under international law, a sovereign state retains the primary
responsibility and authority for the maintenance of law and order in its land
territory.83 Issues such as pursuit or the use of force ashore, in a selfdefense scenario, would likely only arise in a hostage-rescue or ship-rescue
scenario when the sovereign was either unable or unwilling to take the
necessary action to eliminate the threat posed to the victim-state’s forces,
vessels, or nationals.84
Thus, although there are at least three possible justifications under
international law that would support the use of force in Somali land
territory to suppress piracy, the Security Council’s action to authorize force
(with various restrictions) is the most relevant to the current situation.85
The next section analyzes what body of law would apply to give practical

introduction is just one example. Other examples include two separate pirate attacks on U.S. military
vessels in 2010 near Somalia, where the pirates in both cases believed the vessels to be merchant ships.”
(internal citations omitted)). Additionally, the notion that an “imminent threat” justifies the use of force
in self-defense is not without controversy. See, e.g., Daniel Bethlehem, Principles Relevant to the Scope
of a State’s Right of Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Non-State Actors,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 769 (2012).
81. Beyond response to an armed attack, the special case of hostage rescue may serve as an
additional narrow justification for the use of force ashore to rescue nationals held as hostages, but again,
only if the sovereign were unable or unwilling to adequately protect the hostages or deal with the
situation. See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice: General Course in Public
International Law, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 145 (1982) (“General Scranton, the U.S. representative to
the UN in 1976, stated, in the context of a debate about Israel’s use of force in Uganda to rescue its
nationals, “Israel’s action in rescuing the hostages necessarily involved a temporary breach of the
territorial integrity of Uganda. Normally, such a breach would be impermissible under the Charter of
the United Nations. However, there is a well-established right to use limited force for the protection of
one’s own nationals either from an imminent threat of injury or death in a situation where the state in
whose territory they are located is either unwilling or unable to protect them.”).
82. See Gettleman, supra note 1.
83. See Ashley S. Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward A Normative Framework for
Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 483, 504 (2012) (“In the best-case scenario, the
territorial state is willing and able to suppress the threat. In that case, the victim state achieves its goal
without expending resources, and the territorial state preserves its sovereignty.”).
84. See id. at 489 (“The fact that states currently are acclimated to using the “unwilling or unable”
test suggests that any other test would have to overcome a high bar to become the preferred test, a
hurdle no other option is poised to meet.”)
85. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 2125, supra note 9.
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effect to the Council’s decision.
II. LAW APPLICABLE TO THE USE OF FORCE IN SOMALIA
As described above, the U.N. Security Council has authorized the use
of force in Somali territory “for the purpose of suppressing acts of piracy
and armed robbery at sea.”86 The use of such force in the territory of
another sovereign state must be undertaken pursuant to law—but what law?
This section addresses whether international humanitarian law applies to
the use of force ashore in Somalia to carry out the mandate of Security
Council.
The conclusion is not straightforward. Depending on how U.N.
member states undertake a complex and fact-intensive analysis, the
situation may or may not rise to the level of an armed conflict. IHL clearly
applies during armed conflict.87 But notwithstanding such a conclusion,
this section argues that IHL should apply in any case to this “gray zone”
conflict. The Security Council is competent to declare IHL applicable, and
IHL is the lex specialis that is best suited to giving practical effect to the
Council’s decision while ensuring humanitarian protections.
According to Resolution 1851, enforcement measures taken in
Somalia must be “consistent with applicable international humanitarian and
human rights law.”88 It was noted in Part I that this reference to both IHL,
the law that applies during armed conflict, as well as the more generally
applicable human rights law, is significant because it implies that force is
authorized.89 It is also significant, though, for its plain-language invocation
of “applicable IHL” to “all necessary measures” authorized ashore.90 At
the same time, the invocation of “human rights law” cannot be ignored, and
I note potential areas of overlap below.
We must first determine how to characterize the ongoing conflict in
Somalia and off its coast between the organized groups of armed piratefighters on one side,91 and the U.N. member states carrying out the Security
86. See S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9; Hampson, supra note 12.
87. See Hampson, supra note 12, at 550.
88. S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9.
89. See also GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 131–32.
90. S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6.
91. Throughout this section the term “pirate-fighter” refers to a member of an organized armed
network of sea-going pirates and shore-based fighters, including their leaders, financiers, facilitators
and hostage-keepers ashore, the captains of “motherships” and logistics suppliers at sea, and the
seafarers who launch attacks. Though the full extent of Somali pirate-fighter coordination and
organization is disputed (and analyzed below), this shorthand is merely used to distinguish organized
and networked pirates who are managed ashore from the more straightforward definition of piracy as an
international crime under UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101.
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Council’s mandate on the other. This question gives rise to three potential
scenarios.
First, a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) could be found to
exist, thus clearly invoking “applicable IHL.”92 Second, there might be a
scenario in which the hostilities fall short of a NIAC, but IHL is
nonetheless determined to apply. Finally, if IHL were determined not to
apply, the military force authorized by the Security Council would need to
be governed by other existing law, including human rights law and Somali
domestic law. This latter case may present gaps that prevent the full
mandate of the Council from being realized.
I address each of these scenarios in turn. Additionally, throughout the
analysis I examine how both sets of legal frameworks present challenges,
and suggest some ways to overcome those challenges.
A. If a NIAC were to exist, IHL would clearly apply
Notwithstanding any legal justification for the use of force, IHL would
normally only apply to the use of such force if the situation falls into one of
two “law triggering” scenarios—international armed conflict (IAC), or
NIAC.93 IAC can quickly be dismissed because it presupposes the use of
armed force between two or more states.94 Even though U.N. member
states might be using force in Somalia, any use of such force would be
aligned with the sovereign government of Somalia, not against it.95
Member states would be acting with the consent of the Somali government
against a non-state group in their territory,96 which could be considered a
92. As a subset of this scenario, the organized pirate-fighters could be associated with an existing,
already-recognized NIAC in Somalia, that is, Al Shabaab. This scenario is explored in Section B.2,
infra.
93. See Articles 2 and 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 [hereinafter Common
Article 2, Common Article 3]. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, opened for signature, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
94. See Common Article 2, supra note 93.
95. Though the Security Council has consistently authorized such measures “in Somalia,” they
have always been done pursuant to the request of the Somali government. See S.C. Res. 2125, supra
note 9.
96. Indeed, Resolution 1851 implies that the Somali government must consent to specific actions
taken ashore in their territory. See S. C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6 (noting that all necessary measures
are authorized, inter alia, “for which advance notification has been provided by the TFG to the
Secretary-General”).
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NIAC if certain conditions are met. If a NIAC were to exist, the body of
IHL applicable in that type of conflict clearly would apply.
This section first examines the factors used to determine the existence
of a NIAC. Second, it turns to some challenges in applying the existing
NIAC framework to the unique scenario of armed, land-based groups of
pirate-fighters in Somalia. Finally, if the IHL applicable to NIAC is found
to apply to the conflict, this section briefly addresses how the most relevant
principles of that body of IHL would be applied.
1. Is there a NIAC?
Whether a NIAC exists is a question of fact.97 Under the Geneva
Conventions, non-international armed conflicts are those “not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the High
Contracting Parties . . . .”98 Following calls for greater clarity, this
definition was significantly refined with the entry into force of Additional
Protocol II (AP II) in 1978.99 Under that treaty, a NIAC would only be
found to exist if a conflict occurring within a state is between its forces and
“other organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations . . . .”100 Further, AP II
specifically does not apply to “situations of internal disturbances and
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts
of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.”101
Strictly under the AP II definition, the Security Council’s authorized
force against organized armed pirates in Somalia would likely fall short of
the criteria for a NIAC.102 It would hit several wickets, though. Because
they are hierarchically organized, pirate-fighter networks might be
considered “organized armed groups” who operate from discrete bases

97. See INT’L L. ASSOC., FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF ARMED CONFLICT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2010).
98. See Common Article 3, supra note 93.
99. See Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of Internal Armed Conflict in
International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 91–92 (2005), citing INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1325 (1987).
100. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7
Dec. 1978, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II].
101. Id.
102. While Somalia is not a party to AP II, many of its provisions are considered to be customary
international law. Additionally, the obligations of U.N. member states under AP II would possibly be
implicated by their participation in any NIAC. For the purpose of this analysis, I assume that IHL would
apply to any NIAC occurring in Somalia.
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ashore.103 Pirates systematically launch coordinated attacks on merchant
ships with tactics and weapons that could be considered as part of
“sustained and concerted military operations.”104 Additionally, piratefighters don’t clearly invoke any of the scenarios specifically excepted
from the AP II definition. There is no significant internal disturbance;
rather, their force in attacking ships is dedicated, directed, and lethal.105
Their violence is not “isolated and sporadic”—indeed, even ashore, their
keeping of hostage-prisoners is protracted and planned.106
But there are significant challenges to such a characterization. The
definition of NIAC espoused in AP II, by its text, applies to organized
armed groups that fight the government.107 Somali pirates do not generally
engage in belligerent acts with government forces. Instead, they use
violence against civilian ships at sea. Additionally, pirate-fighters do not
fit the traditional NIAC narrative of insurgents seeking political change.
They are in all likelihood motivated by private gain, although their true
motivations are not entirely clear. While subjective motivations for
violence are not strictly part of the AP II definition, in this case they form
part of a narrative that is sometimes used to justify pirates’ violent acts.
It is difficult to conclusively determine how much these unique
distinctions cause trouble with fitting the case of shore-based pirate-fighter
networks into the definition of NIAC under international law. I return to
these unique characteristics later, but I first analyze how well other
attributes of the potential conflict fit within the current law defining NIAC.
Beyond AP II, international tribunals and subsequent treaties have created a
more detailed framework to consider.108 The most widely cited case that
expands on the definition of NIAC is from the International Criminal

103. It is also not clear whether organized groups of pirate-fighters would meet the AP II
requirements of being “under responsible command . . . and [being able] to implement [the] Protocol.”
AP II, supra note 100, art. 1. This is addressed further in Part II.A.1.a.2 infra. See also PARTNERSHIP &
ACTION PLAN, supra note 20.
104. AP II, supra note 100.
105. See IMO Piracy Report, supra note 4.
106. See Singh, supra note 7.
107. See AP II, supra note 11, art. 1(1) (stating that the Protocol applies “between [the state’s]
armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups”). This treaty-based
definition has since been expanded by international criminal tribunals to include fighting between
organized armed groups. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995) (“[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between
States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups within a State.”).
108. See Karl Josef Partsch, Armed Conflict, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
¶ 26 (Rudolf Bernhardt, ed., 1992).
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Tribunal for Yugoslavia—Prosecutor v. Tadic.109 The case is noteworthy
not only for its detailed analysis of the threshold of NIAC, but also for its
broad acceptance.110 The Tadic decision on jurisdiction is widely
considered to reflect customary international law,111 and parts of the
holding were ultimately codified in Art. 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute.112
a. Tadic factors
In Tadic, two factors were analyzed to determine whether a de facto
armed conflict existed: the intensity of the hostilities, and the organization
of the parties to the conflict.113 Each is addressed in turn.
1. Intensity of the conflict
The pirates’ violent acts at sea and on shore likely satisfy the
“intensity of the hostilities” threshold that the Court articulated in Tadic.114
In evaluating the level of hostilities, the Court focused “on the protracted
nature of the conflict vice [sic] the magnitude of the attacks.”115 But even
the magnitude of the pirates’ protracted hostilities is significant. A recent
U.N. report noted that “[i]n 2011, using better and heavier weapons, pirates
have targeted more oil tankers and sailing vessels. Violence against
seafarers has also increased.”116 The type of weapon used is one indicator

109. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 163–70 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); see also Cullen, supra note 99, at 98 (“[Tadic]
considerably influenced the development of international humanitarian law.”).
110. Tadic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 163–70; Cullen, supra note 99, at 98.
111. See Ian Corey, The Fine Line Between Policy and Custom: Prosecutor v. Tadic and the
Customary International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 166 MIL. L. REV. 145, 155 (2000) (“the
[Tadic] court seemed to conclude that such pronouncements evidenced both practice and opinio juris by
implication.”).
112. See Anthony Cullen, The Parameters of Internal Armed Conflict in International
Humanitarian Law, 12 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 189, 206 (2004) (“The Tadic formula for the
recognition of internal armed conflict is included, albeit slightly amended, in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.”). By its inclusion, it ultimately governs whether a NIAC exists for the
purpose of determining liability for war crimes.
113. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
114. This section looks only at the “absolute value” of hostilities and sets aside the issue that the
hostilities are addressed in the “axis” between the pirates and ships at sea (versus between the pirates
and government forces or possibly another armed group). This anomaly is addressed separately.
115. ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 127 (2010) (“It is clear that the intensity required for the
existence of armed conflict is above that of internal disturbances and tensions. It is also clear that
hostilities need not reach the magnitude of ‘sustained and concerned military operations.’ The issue is
one of clarifying the threshold of intensity that is required for the characterization of a situation as one
of armed conflict. This degree of intensity hinges on the interpretation of the word ‘protracted.’”).
116. Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 9.
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of whether an armed conflict exists.117 In this case, the weapons used by
pirates rise to the level of crew-served weapons, and have inflicted damage
on naval warships.118
Focusing specifically on the “protracted nature of the conflict,”
organized pirate-fighters have controlled vast areas of the sea off the coast
of Somalia for several years. In 2008, the Security Council first expressed
grave concern over “the threat that acts of piracy and armed robbery
against vessels pose to the prompt, safe and effective delivery of
humanitarian aid to Somalia, the safety of commercial maritime routes and
to international navigation,” and deplored the “recent incidents of attacks
upon and hijacking of vessels.”119 Since then, the Council has addressed
the issue in terms of a threat to international peace and security twelve
times.120 The scope of the authorized response has also progressed.121
Further, there is good reason that the current lull in the violence
should not save pirate-fighters from a conclusion that hostilities are still
protracted and ongoing. Bases, materials, and equipment still render them
capable of escalating their attacks, and they still actively hold ships for
ransom and keep captives ashore.122 The intensity of the hostilities could
be seen as extending to the ruthless treatment of hostages and prisoners,
and to the widespread practice of employing children in low-level pirate
attacks.123
Thus, the combination of sustained attacks at sea using military
hardware and tactics since at least 2008, coupled with a robust and violent
shore-based hostage network, makes the pirate conflict fall readily within
the Tadic threshold for the intensity of the conflict.
2. Organization of the parties
The difficulty in gathering reliable open-source data regarding pirate
network operations makes it ultimately unclear whether pirates would meet
the substantive requirements of an “organized armed group,” which is the
second threshold question for a NIAC under Tadic.124 According to U.N.
117. See Prosecutor v. Haradinij, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 49, 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
118. See Suspected Pirates Nabbed After Skirmish with U.S. Navy Ship, CNN (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/04/01/navy.pirates/index.html.
119. See supra note 35.
120. Id.
121. See S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 2077, supra note 35, ¶ 10.
122. See Singh, supra note 7.
123. Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 35.
124. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
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reports, pirate clans fall under responsible commands in a hierarchical
structure, although it is not clear how much coordination is done between
various clans.125 Clans of pirates “exud[e] cold ruthlessness and
demonstrat[e] a proclivity for torture and violence.”126 Pirate leaders have
even given statements to the press from their lawless enclaves, in one case
claiming that they cannot be stopped.127 In the context of prosecutions, the
U.S. has claimed the need to target the “upper tiers of the pirate hierarchy,”
and demonstrate “that individuals beyond the gunmen in skiffs are
culpable . . . .”128 Their organization is further underscored by their
development of a piracy “stock exchange.”129
Furthermore, pirate clans operate from discrete bases along the coast
of Somalia, and operate in designated areas both on land and at sea. Armed
pirate groups exercise de facto control over their territory.130 Indeed, this
control is what has allowed them to function outside the law in the first
place.
Thus, although a lack of reliable information impedes a clear
conclusion, significant indicators exist that the pirates’ level of
organization meets the threshold contemplated in Tadic. U.N. member
states undertaking such analyses, furthermore, would likely have greater
means at their disposal, including discrete intelligence collection, to make a
more specific and credible determination.
3. Challenges to applying the Tadic framework
The Tadic decision is commonly viewed as having expanded the
number of conflicts considered to be a NIAC, as compared with the
definition in AP II.131 While it certainly seems to offer a more holistic
125. See Joshua Hammer, Tracking Somali Pirates to Their Lair, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/books/review/the-pirates-of-somalia-by-jay-bahadur-bookreview.html (“The organizational structure of typical pirate cells . . . includes not just attackers,
interpreters, accountants and cooks: almost every group also has its supplier of khat, . . . high or low,
these brigands practice some peculiar rituals. After receiving his cut of the ransom on the captured ship,
one pirate tells Bahadur, each man must toss his mobile phone into the ocean—a precaution to make
sure no one can call ahead to his kin to arrange an ambush of his fellow cell members.”).
126. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. See David McKenzie, No way to stop us, pirate leader says, CNN (Dec. 4, 2008),
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-12-01/world/pirate.interview_1_international-maritime-bureau-somalicoast-pirate-attacks.
128. See Andrew J. Shapiro, Turning the Tide on Somali Piracy, Remarks to the Atlantic Council
(Oct. 26, 2012).
129. See Sterling, supra note 22.
130. Res. 1950 Report, supra note 5, ¶ 14 (“Recently, ‘Galmudug’ has become one of the most
prolific pirate bases. The ‘Galmudug’ counter-piracy task force has expressed its intention to develop a
maritime police unit both on and off shore.”).
131. Cullen, supra note 99, at 108–09.
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framework for analysis, it still doesn’t lead to a firm conclusion that the use
of force under Resolution 1851 against Somali pirate-fighters would rise to
that level. The two problems first introduced above—the direction of
hostilities to sea (versus toward the government), and the motive for private
gain—still present unique concerns with labeling it “armed conflict.”
While it is ultimately unclear how these two additional nuances would
change the analysis under Tadic, there is a strong case to be made that they
should not disrupt an otherwise reasonable conclusion that the scenario
constitutes a NIAC.
Although pirates target civilian ships at sea instead of government
forces, there are two reasons that this should not save them from being
considered capable of engaging in a NIAC if other required criteria are
satisfied. First, the pirates’ hostilities must be viewed in the context of their
base of operations: Somalia, a country of widespread and relative (though
recently improving) lawlessness.132 The presence of armed pirate fighters
presents a hostile threat to the government’s authority, even though they
may not be actively fighting government troops. The complexity of
organized pirate operations strongly suggests that they operate with
impunity in the areas they control.133 They have used bases on land (as
well as vessels docked directly offshore) to hold dozens of hostages in
inhumane conditions.134
Thus, hostilities between the pirates and
government forces can be considered “latent.” Their organization and
control presents a hostile threat to the government’s authority and the rule
of law. The government is unable to respond, but if it were to engage in
hostilities with the armed pirate clans, those activities would likely be
considered NIAC. Therefore, U.N. member states should be seen as
stepping into the government’s role (and a potential NIAC) when carrying
out the Security Council’s decision in Resolution 1851 and using force
consistent with the Somali government’s request.
Second, international tribunals have not held that participation by
government forces is required, AP II notwithstanding.135 In Tadic, the
Court was confronted with a determination of whether a novel situation
was included in the definition of armed conflict, one in which “no
government party is involved because two or more non-state entities are

132. See UN experts on use of mercenaries urge greater oversight for private security contractors,
UNITED NATIONS NEWS CENTER REPORT (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp
?NewsID=43797#.UYHCDbWR98E.
133. See PLOCH ET AL., supra note 8, at 10–11.
134. See KAIJA HURLBURT ET AL., THE HUMAN COST OF SOMALI PIRACY REPORT, 7–8 (2012).
135. AP II, supra note 100, art. 1(1).
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fighting each other.”136 The Court signaled that the involvement of a
government actor was not a necessary criterion for a NIAC as long as the
organization of the parties and level of the hostilities were sufficient to
meet the required thresholds. It would follow, then, that if, hypothetically,
the civilian ships attacked by pirates fought back (thereby reciprocating
hostilities), the scenario would more closely approach the criteria for
NIAC.137 The attacking of defenseless civilian vessels—which are never
considered lawful targets of attack—instead of another fighting force
should not save pirates from being considered as involved in a NIAC if
other relevant criteria are satisfied. The pirate-fighters’ unlawful holding
of civilian prisoners and attacks on civilian targets could be seen as types of
“war crimes” that, on account of their magnitude, should be considered in
the analysis. In evaluating a traditional “rebel-on-state” NIAC, the
“intensity of the hostilities” would likely consider the magnitude of any
unlawful acts of violence, in addition to the hostilities engaging state
forces.138 It seems unusual that the potential war crimes of pirate-fighters
(that is, the targeting innocent civilians) would not be considered in the
magnitude of hostilities simply because they also happen to be crimes of
universal jurisdiction under international law.
While pirates’ primary aim is commonly accepted to be financial gain,
their purported lack of political motivation should not render them
incapable of engaging in NIAC.139 There are two reasons for this. First, it
has no foundation in IHL.140 Second, it is contrary to at least some pirates’
claimed justification for their actions.141
Neither AP II nor the Tadic definitions, nor any other instrument of

136. See CULLEN, supra note 115, at 119.
137. This limited hypothetical is for illustration purposes only. Any involvement in hostilities on
the part of pirated vessels would need to be organized in order to rise to the level of a NIAC, and it
would present the additional complication of shifting the dynamic to one vis-à-vis the pirate-fighters
and their victim ships, versus the relevant dynamic of pirate-fighters vis-à-vis the Somali government
combined with other states enforcing relevant U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
138. See also Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, et al., Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 407 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 27, 2007) (“[factors for evaluating the intensity of the conflict
include] the seriousness of attacks and potential increase in armed clashes, their spread over territory
and over a period of time, the increase in the number of government forces, the mobilisation and the
distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict, as well as whether the conflict has attracted
the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and if so whether any resolutions on the matter
have been passed.”).
139. The overlap with liability under criminal law for pirates’ actions is addressed further, infra.
140. See Sylvain Vité, Typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian law: legal
concepts and actual situations, 91 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 69, 78 (Mar. 2009).
141. See Rep. of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia, ¶ 90, U.N. Doc. S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011) (Jack Lang) [hereinafter Lang Report].
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IHL, speaks to the subjective motive of an “other organized group” for
espousing violence.142 Nonetheless, pirates are sometimes given a reflexive
“pass” because their goals are perceived to be mere subsistence in
admittedly one of the most challenging domestic economies in the world.143
Some commentators have even justified pirates’ violence.144 But focusing
solely on the pirates’ supposed profit motive is contrary to some pirates’
claimed intent. Adopting a model pirates themselves have advocated, they
do, in fact, have political objectives—to protect the Somali coast and
eliminate foreign influence, including dumping.145 Ironically, giving
pirates the status that they themselves seem to desire makes them more
likely to be considered an organized fighting force with a common mission
and the desire to employ hostilities to achieve it.146 This seems to push
them closer to the customary international law definition of NIAC as
reflected in Tadic.
Thus, concerns that the pirates’ motives or chosen victims make the
existence of a NIAC less likely would be largely misplaced.147 These two
challenges can be accommodated by the AP II definition amplified by the
Tadic framework. Broader implications of this possible gap in the NIAC
framework are explored next.
b. Problems presented by the pirate-fighter case to the definition of
NIAC
Those who have analyzed the case of Somali piracy have all
concluded that a NIAC does not currently exist.148 The question, however,

142. See CULLEN, supra note 115, at 130–31.
143. See, e.g., Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 6 (implying an analogy with displaced persons who
“cross a land border and begin hijacking trucks, to make a living following the destruction of their farm
lands. In such a case we would not seriously contend that such displaced persons were in any sense
acting as belligerents.”).
144. Nicole Stillwell, Robbers or Robinhoods?: A Study of the Somali Piracy Crisis and A Call to
Develop an International Framework to Combat Maritime Terrorism, 7 LOY. MAR. L.J. 127, 134–35
(2009) (“These detainees are being charged with piracy, although not all Somali attacks are piracy per
se. Somalis do not always act for private ends. Somalis act to defend their coasts and support their
communities. Additionally, their attacks are not only on the high seas, but also in their coastal waters
and exclusive economic zones. They are supported by local government and their community. Finally,
their attacks originated as a means to provide support and protection in the absence of government.
Thus, the incidents in Somalia do not resemble piracy pursuant to the definitions under UNCLOS.”).
145. See, e.g., Lang Report, supra note 141, ¶¶ 12–13.
146. However, pirates could never be a legitimate Coast Guard because their violence is not
sanctioned by the sovereign—in this case, Somalia.
147. See Stillwell, supra note 144.
148. See Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 3–7; see also Treves, supra note 32, at 412 (“This is not use
of force against the enemy according to the law of armed conflict, because there is no armed conflict,
international or internal. Pirates are not at war with the states whose flotillas protect merchant vessels in
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does not yet seem to have been framed as one encompassing the whole of
organized pirate-fighter activity—both on shore and at sea.149 Most
attempted applications of the threshold criteria for a NIAC have centered
on the pirates’ actions at sea only.150 When the Tadic factors analyzed
above are fully considered, however, the actions of organized piratefighters ashore provide the most thorough and consistent support for the
notion that a NIAC could be found in Somalia between states enforcing
Resolution 1851 and these pirate-fighter groups. This section addresses
other possible objections to applying the NIAC framework to the whole of
organized pirate activity, including the overlap with criminal law and the
challenges U.N. member states face when making determinations about
what law applies to their actions ashore in Somalia.
1. Law enforcement overlap
To be clear, I do not claim that the international law of piracy
contained in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does
not apply.151 There is no reason that the international crime of piracy at sea
could not occur in conjunction with, as well as independent of, a possible
NIAC. Just as those engaged in a more familiar civil war-type NIAC may
be liable criminally for violations committed incidental to that conflict, so
too are those parts of the pirate-fighter network that launch sea-based
attacks. While the attacks against merchant ships are certainly crimes of
universal jurisdiction under international law,152 they might also be
launched with military-style weapons using a highly organized force
operating in networks thousands of miles from shore. The issue of whether
such acts are part of a much larger NIAC is a separate question from the
issue of criminal liability for any particular act of piracy.
2. State practice and the challenge of recognition
The notion that any type of armed conflict exists with pirate-fighters
ashore is likely controversial. The difficulty of determining whether a
NIAC exists, especially at the lower end of the spectrum, has been

the waters off the coast of Somalia . . . . Whatever opinion one holds about the applicability of the law
of armed conflict, it is a fact that practice in the waters off Somalia seems to indicate that warships
patrolling these waters resort to the use of weapons only in response to the use of weapons against
them.” (emphasis added)); Sterio, supra note 70. Finally, the Lang Report, supra note 141, makes no
mention of armed conflict.
149. Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 3–7.
150. Id.
151. UNCLOS, supra note 15, arts. 100–105.
152. See J. Ashley Roach, Countering Piracy Off Somalia: International Law and International
Institutions, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 397, 398 (2010).
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recognized. In the Tablada case, the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights found that:
[t]he most difficult problem regarding the application of Common
Article 3 is not at the upper end of the spectrum of domestic
violence, but rather at the lower end. The line separating an
especially violent situation of internal disturbances from the
“lowest” level Article 3 armed conflict may sometimes be blurred
and, thus, not easily determined. When faced with making such a
determination, what is required in the final analysis is a good faith
and objective analysis of the facts in each particular case.153

Even though the Security Council has not, as of yet, noted that this
particular situation in Somalia rises to the level of a NIAC, a “good faith
and objective analysis of the facts,” as the Tablada Court suggested, might
lead some states to conclude that a NIAC exists between at least some
organized pirate-fighters, on one side, and the Somali government
(supported by states enforcing Resolution 1851) on the other.154 As
tribunals have noted, the standard is difficult to apply.155 Because the
decision of the Security Council was unclear,156 it falls to states that carry
out the Council’s decision to undertake the analysis.157 Prospectively,
states necessarily engage in an independent analysis of the existence of a
NIAC—a law-triggering decision—when deciding how they might give
effect to the Security Council’s mandate. One could envision individual
states giving more or less weight to the Council’s invocation of “applicable
IHL.”158
Presently, however, no state has publicly concluded that the situation
has risen to a NIAC.159 As a hypothetical, suppose that organized groups

153. Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 55/97,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. ¶ 153 (1997) [hereinafter Tablada].
154. None of the applicable Security Council Resolutions currently recognizes a NIAC in Somalia
involving armed pirate groups. The International Committee of the Red Cross, while recognizing the
existence of a NIAC in Somalia between the government and the Al Shabaab militia, recognizes no
such state of conflict vis-à-vis armed pirates. As of this writing, no states have publicly expressed that
IHL applies to the use of force against armed pirates, and it is unclear if EUNAVFOR made that
affirmative conclusion prior to the May 2012 use of force. To be clear, there might be situations in
which IHL is determined to apply without concluding that a NIAC exists. These are explored further
below.
155. See Tablada, supra note 153, ¶ 153.
156. See introduction to Section II, supra.
157. This is not to suggest that any such determination would be made capriciously. Such
conclusions are always subject to domestic and international political review, judgment, and possible
criticism and revision. Mechanisms are in place to correct clearly erroneous conclusions, including
review by the Security Council under Chapter VII. See U.N. Charter, supra note 76, arts. 39–42.
158. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6.
159. According to the author’s research as of December 31, 2013. See also supra note 154.
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of armed pirates operated from an expansive physical headquarters on the
coast, and employed a rigid hierarchical chain of command, including
“Pirate Admirals” and “Flotilla Commodores” that directed the actions of
individual ships in seeking out civilian “victim vessels” at sea. Several
smaller “pirate stations” dock ships and house logistics depots whose local
commanders report directly to the high pirate headquarters.
In this hypothetical, the headquarters formulates strategy. Their initial
success means that their strategy must evolve over time in response to the
targets’ changing tactics. Leaders at headquarters direct subordinate bases
to launch individual attacks, but don’t micromanage details, which are left
to individual captains and lieutenants. Once a transiting merchant is
located by a ship in this pirate forces network, the victim vessel would be
subject to an attack with grenade launchers and machine gun fire. The
specific tactics used would be modified in accordance with headquarters’
most recent strategic guidance. The attack would be enough to implore the
vessel to stop, but not to sink it or significantly damage its cargo. Small
boats of soldier-sailors under the command of the pirate ship’s master
would take over the ship, commandeer it, and take all crewmembers
hostage.
Once taken hostage, captives would be sent back to shore via the same
highly-developed network. At that point, other officers in the rigid
hierarchy would kick into gear, immediately starting the negotiation
process to demand ransom for the vessel. Separate financiers could trade
shares of the vessel being held, thus laying claim to future ransom payouts
while at the same time funding more current operations. Local citizens far
and wide know that their government’s forces are powerless to stop the
armed pirates. In fact, the government doesn’t even attempt to do so. (All
of their limited resources are engaged in fighting a separate resistance
movement.) Local police efforts to subdue and overtake the headquarters
would be futile given the significant cache of military hardware that
protects it. By extension, the local and national authorities are powerless to
stop the increasingly ruthless and violent attacks perpetrated by the pirates
at sea, yet based, directed, and networked from their headquarters ashore.
In this hypothetical, the Tadic factors—organization of the parties and
the level of hostilities—start to approach a theoretical extreme. It becomes
difficult to argue that a regime of NIAC should not apply to the pirates’
organized and coordinated violent acts.160 As stated above, though, in
160. The situation can even start to be seen as one of hostilities with the sovereign state, except
that the sovereign state is powerless to initiate the use of force. In this sense, the “level of hostilities”
prong should allow for the possibility of “latent hostilities”—situations in which the lawless group is so
powerful and the state so relatively weak that the unlawful group should not be saved from being
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reality it is individual states that make independent assessments of the
existence (or lack thereof) of a NIAC based on the facts, subject to review
and possibly clearer guidance by the Security Council. A determination
that there is a NIAC allows for the application of IHL, which reflects the
reality of the required response in the above hypothetical.
One possible conclusion states might consider is that IHL would apply
to the use of force ashore in Somalia even if the threshold for NIAC is not
reached. This idea, which possibly underscored the EU’s constraints and
targeting decisions when it used force ashore in May 2012, is explored
further below. But first, I look at how the substantive principles of IHL
might be applied to the Council’s mandate for use of force against pirates.
2. If there is a NIAC, how would IHL be applied?
The substantive IHL applicable during NIAC is set forth in various
sources, most specifically in AP II.161 As discussed above, AP II expands
on Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which bestowed certain
minimum obligations on the parties.162 Additionally, the customary IHL
applicable during NIAC would apply to the conduct of hostilities.163 This
section broadly analyzes these principles specific to the application of
force—the most relevant subset of IHL here because they are needed to
give effect to the Council’s mandate.
a. Destruction of pirates’ materiel
The most fundamental customary principles of IHL—necessity,
proportionality, and discrimination—would apply to the use of force in
Somalia against pirates’ “boats, vessels, arms and other related

considered engaged in a NIAC because of their ruthlessly violent, but possibly private ends. This would
also approach the requirement in Tadic that an armed conflict requires “protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a state.”
See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
161. See AP II, supra note 100, arts. 4–18.
162. Scholars have disagreed about the applicability of AP II in situations where a foreign power
intervenes on behalf of government forces. In the context of the situation in Mali, scholars have noted
that, “[a] broader interpretation—one that, in the view of the present authors, better fits with the
language employed, as well as with basic logic—is that the Protocol applies to each and every party to
any armed conflict that meets the criteria of Article 1(1).” Rogier Bartels, The French intervention in
Mali and Additional Protocol II, ARMED GROUPS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW BLOG (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://armedgroups-internationallaw.org/2013/01/17/the-french-intervention-in-mali-and-additionalprotocol-ii/.
163. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A
Contribution to the Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV.
OF THE RED CROSS 175 (2005).
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equipment.”164 This pirate materiel could be destroyed much as any
military target could be designated in an armed conflict scenario, with strict
adherence to fundamental principles of IHL.
First, the principle of necessity would govern the selection of
targets.165 Military necessity has historically been considered an expansive
concept that prohibited only attacks that led to no concrete military
advantage.166 In the case of using force on land to suppress piracy at sea,
however, “military advantage” could be defined more narrowly to give
precise effect to the Council’s mandate. Anything used in the course of
piratical attacks could be destroyed, but if a vessel, vehicle, or other piece
of equipment is not directly enabling piracy, attacking it might be
disallowed. Thus, “military necessity” would be derived from the
Council’s decision to use “all necessary measures” to suppress piracy.167
Second, the principle of distinction requires that civilians and civilian
objects be differentiated from lawful military targets.168 As applied here,
states would be required to ensure that civilian residences, fishermens’
boats and equipment, and other objects with no direct connection to piracy
are not targeted.
Finally, proportionality is likely the most difficult principle to apply in
practice. The concrete advantage to be gained from the use of force must
not be disproportionate to the expected civilian collateral damage.169
Proportionality recognizes that some collateral damage is inevitable under
the doctrine of dual effect.170 It is unclear what would constitute acceptable
collateral damage in the piracy context. According to one Council
member, the possibility of collateral damage was known and therefore
likely considered, but the Resolution passed anyway.171 The lowest
possible thresholds would likely need to be applied so that the intent of the
Council is met.
164. See AP II, supra note 100, arts. 4, 13; S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 2.
165. See, e.g., Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International
Humanitarian Law—Volume I: Rules, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 175 (2005), available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf
(“The destruction or seizure of the property of an adversary is prohibited, unless required by imperative
military necessity.”).
166. See Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277, 277 (Susan Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006).
167. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 6.
168. See Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 165, at 25–34.
169. See id. at 46.
170. See DRURY, supra note 61, at 67–68.
171. Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53. Dumisani Kumalo of South Africa “expressed concern
over the provision in the resolution that allowed for States to conduct land-based operations against
piracy, saying there was a danger that innocent Somalis could fall victim to those operations.” Id.
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b. Possible targeting of pirate fighters
Any determination under IHL that would support targeting suspected
pirate-fighters themselves would be much more difficult. By default,
pirates are criminals and not combatants.172 Under several plausible
circumstances, however, they could be lawfully subjected to force.
To be subjected to targeting simply because of their status as parties to
a NIAC, individual pirates must first be positively identified as members of
the organized armed pirate group taking part in the conflict.173 Piratefighters would constitute an “organized armed group” subject to targeting
because of their status alone.174 Even so, there are challenges to making a
conclusive determination about an individual’s status when they
themselves don’t follow relevant IHL provisions regarding identifying
themselves as parties to the conflict.175 Because of these challenges, it is
conceivable that perhaps only very few individuals would qualify based on
the information required for pirate fighters to be targetable simply because
of their status.
If not positively identified as a pirate-fighter, an individual (by default
a protected civilian under IHL) could also take some action that causes
them to lose their protected status, thus making them targetable. This
determination that the individual is directly “participating in the hostilities”
would require a specific determination to be made prior to such targeting.
Individuals would be targetable only “for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”176
Both of these analyses would be difficult to execute in practice. When
not armed and readying for attack at sea or guarding hostages, Somali
pirates are likely to be generally indistinguishable from fishermen, and
might be in close proximity to other non-combatants during engagements
that would likely take place at significant ranges.177 A rigorous

172. See Kontorovich, supra note 11.
173. Id. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY 4 (2006). The term “combatant” is
unique to IAC. The term “fighter” has been used to describe individuals who engage in NIAC, but the
term does not appear in any binding treaty.
174. For a discussion of the challenges surrounding targeting individuals in NIAC, see Marco
Sassoli & Laura Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law
Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts,
90 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 599, 606–07 (2008).
175. AP II, supra note 100, art. 1
176. AP II, supra note 100, art. 13, ¶ 3; see also Jamie A. Williamson, Challenges of Twenty-First
Century Conflicts: A Look at Direct Participation in Hostilities, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 457, 471
(2010).
177. Proportionality concerns would also need to be addressed.
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intelligence-based analysis and thoroughly vetted status- and conductbased rules of engagement (ROE) would be necessary to ensure strict
adherence to IHL, should the NIAC framework be found to apply. During
a NIAC, though, such targeting would be permissible if done according to
the principles of IHL discussed above. Of note, the targeting of piratefighters is not specifically prohibited by the text of the Resolution, and the
“all necessary measures” language is fundamentally permissive.
There is no evidence the Security Council even considered the
question of specifically targeting individuals.178 The means presented here
by which pirates could be targeted are largely jus in bello restrictions.
There could also be a jus ad bellum restriction on targeting suspected
Somali pirates. That is, the pirates themselves possibly don’t fall within
the scope of the authorization to use force under Resolution 1861. The
Resolution authorizes “all necessary measures . . . appropriate in
Somalia.”179 Perhaps targeting individual pirates is not necessary to pursue
the Council’s objectives. Or, perhaps the Somali government would not
consider it appropriate. Though IHL might be found to apply to the
conflict, these restrictions could otherwise limit the means by which the
states aligned with the Security Council and Somalia could carry out that
mandate for political reasons. Under a functional approach, these limits
would be legally unobjectionable.180
In any case, the Security Council’s intent to use force in Somalia to
suppress piracy might be effectively executed without targeting individual
pirate-fighters. A further analysis of this question is beyond the scope of
this Article, but given the humanitarian situation in Somalia it is perhaps
even preferable. The restrictions discussed in this section are only those
arising under international law. Other concerns, including policy and
domestic law, may cause participating states to put more robust restraints
on the use of force in this context. Applying IHL is possible without
declaring pirate-fighters to be targetable per se.
Finally, whether or not IHL applied, if an individual pirate or group of
pirates were to launch an attack or threaten imminent attack on forces
carrying out Resolution 1851, the use of necessary and proportional force

178. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9; Press Release SC/9541, supra note 53.
179. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9.
180. A full examination of possible conflation issues here is beyond the scope of this analysis. See
generally Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus
in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 102–03 (2009) (“[M]odernity has
witnessed an erosion of the dualistic axiom. In part, this reflects the practical pressures brought to bear
on the law of war by advances in technology, geopolitical reconfiguration following the Cold War, and
evolution in the nature of war itself.”).
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in self-defense would be justified.181
B. If the conflict falls short of a NIAC, could IHL still apply?
A finding that a NIAC is underway between pirate-fighters and states
enforcing Resolution 1851 might not be a necessary condition to the
applicability of IHL. Many commentators have recently advanced the idea
that IHL has at least limited applicability to “gray zone” conflicts such as
this,182 and commentators have acknowledged that there is not a full
definition of those situations that fall within the material field of
application of IHL.183 Additionally, there might be circumstances under
which the conflict with organized pirate-fighters could be associated with
the ongoing conflict between Somali government forces, Al Shabaab, and
associated militias.184 Under these two possible scenarios, IHL might be
applied to a situation that does not rise to the level of a discrete NIAC.
1. Applicability of IHL to “gray zone” conflicts
The authorized “necessary measures”—that is, force—most recently
taken by the EU necessarily must have been carried out according to IHL.
While Resolution 1851 provides the jus ad bellum that justifies the use of
force in Somalia to suppress piracy, there must also be an applicable jus in
bello.
“[A]pplicable IHL” was specifically cited in Resolution 1851 in the
same sentence that ultimately authorized force.185 Commentators have
raised the question of whether the Security Council is competent to declare
IHL applicable to its decisions to authorize force that don’t amount to
armed conflict. In analyzing the Council’s authorization for force in Haiti
in 2004, Professor Siobhán Wills raised the question: “[C]an the Security
Council implicitly authorise use of IHL instead of [international human
rights law] in situations where there is no armed conflict (in contradiction
to the terms of the UN’s own Bulletin on the matter) merely by stating that
it is ‘acting under Chapter VII’?”186
181. U.N. Charter, supra note 76, art. 51; See also Kontorovich, supra note 11.
182. See Sven Peterke, Regulating “Drugs Wars” and Other Gray Zone Conflicts: Formal and
Functional Approaches, HUMANITARIAN ACTION IN SITUATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (HASOW),
DISCUSSION PAPER 1, 2 (2012), available at http://hpcrresearch.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Svens%20Paper.pdf.
183. See Vité, supra note 140, at 70.
184. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 12, at 132.
185. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, ¶ 6.
186. Siobhan Wills, The Law Applicable to Peacekeepers Deployed in Situations Where There is
No Armed Conflict, BLOG OF THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-lawapplicable-to-peacekeepers-deployed-in-situations-where-there-is-no-armed-conflict/.
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The issue has generated significant debate. On one hand, the U.N.
Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security” and should be competent to decide that
customary IHL applies to the use of force it specifically authorized. 187 The
Council’s broad authority under the U.N. Charter strongly suggests the
power to determine the applicability of customary IHL to the uses of force
they specifically authorized “to restore international peace and security.”188
The U.N. Security Council is specifically competent to make “calls for the
respect of international humanitarian law.”189
On the other hand, some scholars have dismissed the mention of
“applicable IHL” as merely referring to the law that would otherwise apply,
and thus have given no practical legal effect to the Council’s calls for
additional force on land in Somalia.190 The Security Council, however,
chose to include a reference to IHL. As shown in Part I, it also authorized
force. Thus, it is logical to apply the Security Council’s power to declare
IHL applicable to its desired means for the purpose of reaching its desired
end state, rather than to dismiss it as an irrelevant “savings clause.”191 A
more persuasive interpretation might be that the “applicable IHL” is meant
to refer to at least the general principles of customary IHL—military
necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and humanity—without which
the Council’s decision could not be given full effect. Additionally, the
nature of the force authorized suggests that if customary principles of IHL
did not apply, then no law (or perhaps inadequate or insufficient law)
might be found to apply.192
Some scholars have argued that a functional or “problem-oriented”
approach to the application of IHL is more appropriate than a legalistic
method of determining the existence of NIAC.193 In analogous situations,
some states have applied customary IHL to avoid this legal void,
sometimes in conjunction with applicable human rights law. In the context
of illegal narcotics, for example, “certain governments have declared

187. U.N. Charter, art. 24, 39–42, 103; see also Christiane Bourloyannis, The Security Council of
the United Nations and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, 20 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 335, 342 (1992).
188. U.N. Charter, supra note 77, art. 39–42.
189. See Bourloyannis, supra note 187.
190. See GEISS & PETRIG, supra note 11, at 131–35; Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 6–7 (explaining
that the mention of applicable IHL appears to be a “savings clause included out of the abundance of
caution.”).
191. Guilfoyle, supra note 43, at 7.
192. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 2.
193. See Peterke, supra note 182, at 16–17 (citing Daniel Thurer, INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW: THEORY, PRACTICE, CONTEXT (The Hague, Ail-Pocket 2011)).
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organized crime groups as the most serious threats to public order and
pursued increasingly militarized actions against them.”194 The use of paramilitarized police and armed troops in the struggle against organized crime
groups has “raised questions about whether these situations have the
potential to be classified as armed conflicts.”195
The potential application of IHL to “gray zone” conflicts even outside
of Security Council sanction seems to add further weight to the argument
that the Council is competent to decide the applicability of IHL under
Chapter VII. Commentators have advocated a functional approach to
applying IHL in gray zone conflicts.196 This approach has also been
extended to targeting, which would allow IHL to function effectively to
give effect to the Council’s mandate while preserving humanitarian aims.197
2. Association with the existing NIAC in Somalia
Finally, there is one other entirely separate means by which armed
pirate groups could possibly be considered to be engaged in a NIAC within
Somalia.
Because a separate Security Council Resolution already
recognizes a separate armed confrontation occurring within Somalia,
association of armed pirate groups with armed insurgents could effectively
bring these pirates within the threshold of that NIAC.198 Analysts have
suspected localized links between various pirate factions and other Somali
insurgent groups, including Al Shabaab.199 Scholars have advocated for
considering pirates as terrorists, at least in certain circumstances, and have
drawn considerable parallels between today’s terrorists and pirates.200 At

194. Id. at 2.
195. See Robert Muggah, Part 1: Rethinking the Intensity and Organization of Violence in Latin
America and the Caribbean, REINVENTING PEACE (Feb. 16, 2012), http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventing
peace/2012/02/16/part-i-rethinking-the-intensity-and-organization-of-violence-in-latin-america-and-thecaribbean/.
196. See Peterke, supra note 182; see also Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting
and Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365, 1391–96 (2012).
197. Hakimi, supra note 196.
198. See S. C. Res. 1872, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1872 (May 26, 2009) (“condemn[ing] the recent
resurgence in fighting and calls for the end of all hostilities, acts of armed confrontation and efforts to
undermine the Transitional Federal Government . . . .”).
199. See, e.g., Jonathan Saul & Camila Reed, Shabaab-Somali pirate links growing: UN
adviser, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/20/ozatp-somalia-shabaabpirates-idAFJOE79J0G620111020; see also Richard Lough, Piracy ransom cash ends up with Somali
militants, REUTERS (Jul. 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/06/somalia-piracy-idUS
LDE7650U320110706; Khaled Wassef, Al Qaeda Urges Somalis To Attack Ships, CBS (Apr. 16,
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-4949488-503543.html.
200. See Milena Sterio, Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More Is Needed, 33
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 372, 388 (2010) (“The SUA Convention . . . does solidify the link between piracy
and terrorism, by treating piracy as a form of maritime terrorism and by equating the jurisdictional basis
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this point, however, it does not seem that the links are robust enough to
bring organized pirate groups within the relevant threshold.201 But it would
be a scenario to watch closely as the circumstances may evolve.
C. If IHL were not applied, what law would apply?
If IHL is ultimately found not to apply, it would present a significant
challenge to the effective use of force ashore in Somalia under the
provisions of Resolution 1851. Certain parts of the Council’s mandate
might still be carried out, but force would be limited to that allowed under
Somali domestic law and the international human rights law obligations of
the states giving effect to the Council’s decision.202
The Security Council specifically noted the applicability of human
rights law in Resolution 1851, but did not specify the scope of its
application. Broadly applicable international human rights norms are
reflected in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR).203 Some international human rights instruments even
contain a right to property, which could complicate the ability of states to
neutralize pirates’ weapons and materiel without judicial process.204 Under
a human rights law framework, the targeting of any pirate-fighter would
likely be disallowed except in cases of immediate self-defense.
A full analysis of various member states’ individual obligations under
human rights law is beyond the scope of this Article. The issue is
highlighted only to note the significant challenges it presents to fully
implementing the Council’s decision without applying IHL. Another
significant challenge, and one that has generated great debate, is the
“overlap problem” of competing IHL and HRL obligations.205 These
challenges are confounded by the nature of human rights legal instruments
themselves. Rather than the more universal norms that characterize IHL,
for the capture and prosecution of pirates with those that already exist in other antiterrorist conventions
for the capture and prosecution of terrorists.”).
201. See Singh, supra note 7.
202. Somalia would be obligated to ensure that such law is consistent with international human
rights obligations.
203. ICCPR, supra note 73.
204. Id. art. 9. See also European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions”). The European Court of Human Rights has held that the
convention applies extraterritorially, possibly complicating many nations from participating in UN
enforcement actions.
205. See generally UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
ARMED CONFLICT, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/11/01, U. N. Sales No. E.11.XIV.3 (2011), available at http://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf; see also Sassoli & Olson, supra
note 174.
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human rights obligations are implemented in states’ domestic law and vary
considerably from state to state and especially by region. This could
potentially impact international cooperation in the fight against piracy in a
significant way.
Thus, applying only international human rights law to the Security
Council’s decision in Resolution 1851 presents significant challenges to
effectively carrying out the Council’s mandate. These questions and
challenges would be more satisfactorily addressed if IHL were found to
apply to the Council’s call for the use of force to fight organized piratefighters in Somalia.
CONCLUSION
Using targeted force on land in Somalia to cripple pirate-fighters’
capacity to violently attack civilian shipping and hold innocent mariners
hostage is fully supportable under international law. There are persuasive
reasons that IHL should apply to the use of limited force against armed
pirates in Somalia. If a NIAC is determined to exist, IHL clearly applies.
But even if there is no NIAC, the situation invokes a dynamic and evolving
problem in the application of IHL to emerging and unique “gray zone”
conflicts. IHL is specifically cited by the U.N. Security Council, and is the
lex specialis applicable to the use of force. The level of force authorized,
and indeed already executed, is beyond mere police action and beyond the
applicable scope of human rights law.
Piracy itself is an international crime.206 It is only with the talismanic
“all necessary measures” language of Resolution 1851 that the Security
Council authorized force under Chapter VII.207 Should such use of force
ashore constitute sound policy, this analytical framework will hopefully be
useful in showing how operations can be planned and conducted to satisfy
international law. The use of limited force ashore is intended to be
narrowly tailored to eliminate dangerous pirates’ means of carrying out
lethal attacks at sea and threatening mariners worldwide.
Some scholars have argued that using force ashore to combat piracy
would be unwise.208 This may very well be the case, and I do not attempt
to conflate difficult questions of policy with important questions of law.
Even if attacks at sea were not approaching their lowest level in years,
there still may have been sound policy reasons not to use force. Using

206. See UNCLOS, supra note 15, art. 101, 105.
207. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 9, at ¶ 2.
208. Lesley Anne Warner, An Appraisal of U.S. Counterpiracy Options in the Horn of Africa, 63
NAVAL WAR COLL. REV. 61, 75 (2010).
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force on Somali territory may have the unintended side effect of increasing
violence against ships and current hostages. There could also be
unexpected collateral damage. Another important consideration is the
international community’s pursuit of other development goals in Somalia,
including supporting the nascent federal government and fighting terrorist
organizations, specifically Al Shabaab.
While those are some of the better arguments against using force
ashore, there are also relatively bad ones. Several commentators have
effectively apologized for the pirates’ actions, going so far as to credit their
acts to “defend their coasts and support their communities.”209 The
families of the hundreds who have been held hostage under inhumane
conditions, or those who have been killed in piracy attacks, probably do not
see it the same way. If action ashore has been held in abeyance for policy
reasons, which is likely the case, it would be much better held under the
former set of arguments.
It is true that piracy attacks have been receding. But there is also
indirect evidence that pirates and even innocent fisherman are being killed
by overeager and untrained security guards embarked on vessels transiting
pirate-infested waters.210 If the recent receding of maritime piracy off
Somalia is due to private embarked security teams killing seafarers, it may
be time to rethink any assumption that the use of targeted force ashore is
too risky, or less humane. Furthermore, prosecution strategies, though
expanding, have not proven to be an effective deterrent.211
It is time to at least acknowledge the lawfulness of decisive action—
ashore on Somali land territory with the full consent of the sovereign and
the U.N. Security Council—to uphold the rule of law and ultimately to
protect innocent mariners at sea. As I have shown, a functional approach

209. See Stillwell, supra note 144, at 136–37.
210. See Bockmann & Katz, supra note 14.
211. Some have maintained that changes in U.S. law are needed to more effectively fight piracy.
See Pines, supra note 80, at 99. This may be true, but only to prosecute piracy in the courtroom. It
remains to be seen how effective prosecuting piracy in the courtroom will prove. It is incredibly
difficult. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, A Guantanamo on the Sea: The Difficulty of Prosecuting
Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243 (2010). Furthermore, there is little evidence that
prosecuting pirates at all has served as any sort of deterrent to pirate attacks. Yvonne M. Dutton,
Maritime Piracy and the Impunity Gap: Insufficient National Laws or A Lack of Political Will?, 86
TUL. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (2012). Others have also suggested government security teams, which might
be one reasonable approach. See James W. Harlow, Soldiers at Sea: The Legal and Policy Implications
of Using Military Security Teams to Combat Piracy, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 561, 565 (2012)
(proposing the widespread deployment of military security teams). But there are thousands of ships out
there and 2.5 million square miles of sea. That amounts to a lot of government-provided embarked
security teams.
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that applies IHL would fully employ the legal tools available to address this
international problem.

